

# SCOTT BEHMER

sbehmer@uchicago.edu – sites.google.com/uchicago.edu/scott-behmer/ – (440) 387-8244

<b>Placement Directors:</b>	Ufuk Akcigit	uakcigit@uchicago.edu	(773) 702 0433
	Manasi Deshpande	mdeshpande@uchicago.edu	(773) 702-8260
<b>Graduate Administrator:</b>	Kathryn Falzareno	kfalzareno@uchicago.edu	(773) 702-3026

## Office Contact Information

---

University of Chicago, Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics  
Saieh Hall for Economics  
5757 S University Ave  
Chicago, IL 60637

## Education

---

<b>University of Chicago</b> , Ph.D. Economics	<i>2018–2024</i>
<b>University of Chicago</b> , MA Economics	<i>2017–2018</i>
<b>Purdue University</b> , B.A. Physics	<i>2013–2017</i>

## References

---

Professor Leonardo Bursztyn (Chair)  
University of Chicago  
Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics  
bursztyn@uchicago.edu  
(773) 795-2971

Professor Mikhail Golosov  
University of Chicago  
Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics  
golosov@uchicago.edu  
(773) 702-6405

Professor Wioletta Dziuda  
University of Chicago  
Harris School of Public Policy  
wdziuda@chicagobooth.edu

## Research and Teaching Fields

---

Primary: Public Finance  
Secondary: Political Economy, Environmental Economics

## Job Market Paper

---

### **Carrots vs Sticks: Optimal Climate Policy with Government Turnover**

*Abstract: Climate policy in the US has relied heavily on subsidies for clean energy. This has led to an active debate among economists on the relative merits of subsidies vs the more textbook economic solution of a carbon tax. However, the models used to inform this debate have a common simplifying assumption: the preferences of the government are kept constant over time. In reality, control of the government often rotates between parties with very different policy preferences. This paper finds that adding turnover in party control of the government can have significant implications for the choice of taxes vs subsidies. Specifically, when the two parties are sufficiently polarized, the party more concerned about the environment (“the green party”) finds it optimal to subsidize irreversible investments in clean*

energy, even when carbon taxes are available and can be placed at any level. We then provide quantitative evidence on the green party's optimal subsidy using two approaches: sufficient statistic estimation and a calibration exercise. The results suggest that the optimal subsidy is quantitatively significant, between 5% and 17% of the cost of investment. Furthermore, if the green party naively uses just a carbon tax, clean investment is 34% lower than when they use their optimal subsidy.

## Working Papers

---

### Incomplete Information and Issue Linkage in International Agreements

Abstract: Global public goods problems, such as climate change, are often addressed through international agreements. Occasionally these agreements have involved using other policies, such as trade policy, as a way to incentivize countries to join and uphold the agreement. For example, the Montreal agreement on Ozone-depleting substances includes trade sanctions on non-participants. There have been calls to design future climate agreements in a similar way. This paper offers a novel explanation for why "issue linkage" in international agreements can be beneficial: for many global public goods, there is a significant chance that some countries won't value the public good very highly. For such countries, threats to reduce funding for the public good will be ineffective, whereas threats to impose trade sanctions might work. Even if some countries also don't respond to threats of trade sanctions, issue linkage is still welfare improving because trade sanctions are far more efficient punishments. This argument is formalized using a repeated game with incomplete information. A calibration exercise suggests that using trade sanctions to enforce a climate agreement could significantly increase global welfare.

## Work in Progress

---

**Geopolitical Externalities and Energy Independence Policy** (with Olivier Kooi)

**Measuring Welfare Improvements due to Changes in Job Quality**

**Moderation, Filter Bubbles, and Free Speech** (with Karthik Srinivasan and Rafael Jiménez-Durán)

## Awards, Scholarships, and Grants

---

Global Priorities Fellowship	<i>2020 - 2021</i>
Bradley Fellowship	<i>2021</i>
Becker Friedman Institute Political Economics Grant (\$3000)	<i>2020</i>
Lee Prize for Top Score on Micro Core Exam	<i>2019</i>

## Teaching Experience

---

Honors Microeconomics (undergraduate)	TA for Prof. Lima	<i>Spring 2023</i>
Big Problems (MBA)	TA for Profs. Murphy and Topel	<i>Spring 2022</i>
Price Theory 1 (PhD)	TA for Prof. Murphy	<i>Fall 2019</i>
Honors Econometrics (undergraduate)	TA for Eunki Min	<i>Spring 2018</i>
Average teaching evaluation of 4.8 on a 5 point scale		

## Research Experience and Other Employment

---

Economics Research Assistant for Prof. Reny, University of Chicago	<i>2018–2019</i>
High School Computer Science Course Instructor, Tech Corps	<i>2017</i>
Physics Research Assistant for Prof. Robicheaux, Purdue University	<i>2014–2016</i>

### **Professional Experience**

---

Organizer of Student Political Economy Working Group, University of Chicago	<i>2022–2023</i>
Graduate Student Liason, University of Chicago	<i>2020–2021</i>
Organizer of Political Economy Second Year Course, University of Chicago	<i>Winter 2019</i>

**Presentations**      *Harris School of Public Policy Political Economy Lunch, University of Chicago  
Energy and Environmental Economics Workshop, University of Chicago Student Political Economy Workshop, University of Chicago Student Applied Micro Lunch*

### **Additional Information**

---

<b>Citizenship</b>	USA, Italy
<b>Programming Skills</b>	Python, C++, Stata, Matlab, R